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In this paper we study the impact of more transparency in the foreign exchange market on the ex ante expected volume 
of international trade. Transparency is measured by the informational content of publicly observable signals correlated 
to the random exchange rate. We find that more transparency may increase or decrease the volume of international 
trade. In particular, the impact of more transparency depends the curvature of the marginal cost function of the firms. 
Furthermore, ex ante expected profits of the firms are higher when the foreign exchange market is more transparent. 
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Many papers have stressed the role of uncertainty in international currency markets
for the performance of the real sector of an economy and, in particular, for cross
border trade ﬂows (Cushman (1986), Kawai and Zilcha (1986), Zilcha and Eldor
(1991), Gagnon (1993), Broll and Eckwert (1999), Moschini and Hennessy (2000)).
These contributions study the impact of exchange rate uncertainty on international
trade in a framework where distributional parameters linked to higher moments of
the random future exchange rate are changed in a comparative static way. While
these studies have produced a number of interesting results, they can be criticized
on the grounds that the stochastic nature of the economic environment ought to be
considered an exogenous structural element of the model rather than a policy tool.
And it is hard to see what kind of normative conclusions or policy recommendations
can be drawn from comparative static exercises focusing on shocks to parameters
which are not under the control of policy institutions.
In this paper we follow a diﬀerent approach. Our approach is based on the view
that random exchange rate movements constitute a source of uncertainty which can-
not be manipulated. Even so, the exchange rate uncertainty perceived by individual
decision makers is not completely exogenous as it depends on the ‘transparency’ of
the foreign exchange market. Market transparency can be characterized in terms of
parameters which, at least partially, are under government control. The government
may enhance transparency by making more information available about important
determinants of exchange rate movements, such as the foreign exchange positions
of central banks or ﬁscal and monetary policy rules. In our framework more trans-
parency does not reduce the (ex ante) volatility of the future exchange rate per se.
Instead, the (ex post) distribution of the exchange rate after some public informa-
tion has become available involves less uncertainty if the foreign exchange market
exhibits more transparency.
We consider a model of partial equilibrium where a competitive exporting ﬁrm
faces risky revenues due to a random future exchange rate. The distribution of the
exchange rate is given, and there exists a futures market for foreign exchange. Yet,
the terms at which the ﬁrm can hedge the revenue risk through trade in currency
2futures depends on the transparency of the foreign exchange market. Our notion of
transparency is adopted from the work by Drees and Eckwert (2003). These authors
have characterized market transparency using a criterion which is conceptually re-
lated to the literature that emerged from the seminal works by Blackwell (1953),
Drèze (1960) and Hirshleifer (1971;1975). According to this criterion transparency
is linked to the informativeness of an observable signal which is (imperfectly) cor-
related with the future exchange rate. The signal conveys some information about
the unknown exchange rate and, therefore, allows the ﬁrm to update its beliefs.
The uncertainty to which the ﬁrm is exposed when it decides about export produc-
tion depends on the observed signal as well as on the information system within
which the signal can be interpreted. We characterize the foreign exchange market
as more transparent if the signal conveys more precise information about the future
spot exchange rate. Thus, higher transparency implies that exchange rate risk is
reduced through the dissemination of more reliable information.
How does more transparency in the foreign exchange market aﬀect the export
volume of the international ﬁrm? The answer depends on the curvature of the ﬁrm’s
marginal cost function: more exchange rate transparency stimulates (reduces) ex-
port production if the marginal cost function is concave (convex). By contrast,
expected ﬁrm proﬁts always increase with more exchange rate transparency regard-
less of technological parameters and of attitudes towards risk as long as the cost
function is convex.
These results diﬀer in nature from the ﬁndings in earlier studies which have
adopted a simplistic approach of modeling transparency by means of exogenous
changes in the distributional parameters of the exchange rate (e.g., Franke (1991),
Viaene and de Vries (1992), Broll et.al. (1995)). In such a framework the forward
exchange market is completely separated from the underlying transparency con-
cept; hence, the well-known separation property implies that parameters aﬀecting
the volatility of the exchange rate have no impact on international trade. Yet,
this approach misses out on an important link that exists between exchange rate
transparency and the terms of contracting on the forward exchange market. Taking
this link into account yields new insights into the implications of exchange rate
transparency for international trade.
3The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the ﬁrm’s decision
problem and introduce the concept of transparency which underlies our analysis.
Section 3 contains the main results: we characterize the impact of more trans-
p a r e n c yo nt h ee x p o r tv o l u m ea n do nt h eﬁrm’s expected proﬁts. Section 4 con-
cludes the paper.
2 Export Production and Foreign Exchange Market Transparency
We consider the model of an exporting ﬁrm which extends over two periods, t =0 ,1.
The ﬁrm produces a homogenous good in period 0 and sells its products abroad for
a given price of p1 units of foreign currency. Production costs in domestic currency,
C(x), are a strictly increasing and convex function of the export volume, x.T h e
ﬁrm’s random revenues, as of date 1, in domestic currency are ˜ e1p1x,w h e r e˜ e1 is
the one-period-ahead spot exchange rate between the domestic currency and the
foreign currency. The tilde refers to the random nature of the spot exchange rate
˜ e1 w h i c ha s s u m e sv a l u e si nΩ := [e,e],w h e r e0 <e< e<∞.
As of date 0, when the ﬁrm decides about production, the future exchange rate,
˜ e1, is random. However, prior to choosing a production level, the ﬁrm observes a
signal y. This signal is the realization of a random variable ˜ y which is correlated
with ˜ e1.1 The signal, therefore, contains information about the unknown future
exchange rate. Thus, at the time when the production decision is made, the relevant
expectation for ˜ e1 is the updated (in a Bayesian way) posterior belief.
We assume that the ﬁrm has access to a futures market where it can hedge the
foreign exchange risk. The futures market opens at date 0 after the signal has been
observed. A futures contract pays 1 unit of foreign currency at date 1. Hence the
payoﬀ is worth e1 units of domestic currency. Let h be the forward commitment
of the ﬁrm, i.e., h denotes the number of futures contracts sold by the ﬁrm. We
assume that the terms of forward contracting are unbiased, which implies that the
f u t u r e sm a r k e tc l e a r sa tap r i c eef(y) that is equal to the conditional mean of a




Both the payoﬀ and the purchase price of the contract fall due in period 1. The
timing of events is as follows (see Figure 1):




signal y is observed;
currency futures market opens;
ﬁrm chooses x and h
exchange rate e1 is realized;
output is produced and sold;
futures contracts are settled
Figure 1
2.1 The Decision Problem of the Firm
We assume that the ﬁrm maximizes expected utility, deﬁned over random proﬁts,
˜ Π, where the product price in foreign currency is set equal to 1,
˜ Π =˜ e1x − C(x)+h(ef(y) − ˜ e1). (2)




where U : R → R is a strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice continuously
diﬀerentiable utility function. The ﬁrm maximizes (3) with respect to export pro-
duction, x,a n df o r w a r dc o m m i t m e n th. The necessary ﬁrst-order conditions, which
are also suﬃcient, are
E[U
0(˜ Π)(˜ e1 − C
0(x))] = 0, (4)
E[U
0(˜ Π)(ef(y) − ˜ e1)] = 0. (5)




h = x. (7)
Next we deﬁne our notion of exchange rate transparency. The transparency of the
foreign exchange market will be linked to the informational content of the signal y.
2.2 Information Systems and Exchange Rate Transparency
Following Drees and Eckwert (2003) we identify the transparency of the foreign
exchange market with the ‘informativeness’ of the signal y ∈ Y ⊂ R,w h i c hi s
observed by the ﬁrm. The informativeness of the signal depends on the information
system within which signals can be interpreted. An information system, denoted
by g,s p e c i ﬁes for each state of nature, e1, a conditional probability function over
the set of signals: g(y|e1). The positive real number g(y|e1) deﬁnes the conditional
probability (density) that the signal y will be observed if the true (yet unknown)
state of nature is e1.T h e ﬁrm knows the function g(y|e1) by which the signals
are generated, given the state of nature. Using Bayes’s rule, the ﬁrm revises its
expectations and maximizes utility on the basis of the updated beliefs.
Let π : Ω → R+ be the (Lebesgue-) density function for the prior distribution




g(y|e1)π(e1)de for all y. (8)
The density function for the updated posterior distribution over Ω is3
ν(e1|y)=g(y|e1)π(e1)/ν(y). (9)
Blackwell (1953) suggested a criterion that ranks diﬀerent information systems ac-
cording to their informational contents. Suppose g1 and g2 are two information
2(7) follows from (5) since, according to (1), the futures market is unbiased.
3To avoid notational clutter we distinguish between the functions ν(y) and ν(e|y) only by their
arguments.
6systems with associated density functions ν1(·) and ν2(·). The following criterion
induces an ordering on the set of information systems.
Deﬁnition 1 (Informativeness) Let g1 and g2 be two information systems. g1
is said to be more informative than g2 (expressed by g1 Âinf g2,), if there exists an





0 =1 , (10)









holds for all e1 ∈ Ω.
According to this criterion g1 Âinf g2, holds if g2 can be obtained from g1 through
a process of randomization. The probability density λ(y0,y) in equation (10) trans-
forms a signal y into a new signal y0.I ft h ey0-values are generated in this way, the
information system g2 can be interpreted as being obtained from the information
system g1 by adding random noise. Note that λ(·,·) in (11) is independent of e1.
Therefore, the signals under information system g2 convey no information about
the value of ˜ e1 that is not also conveyed by the signals under information system g1.
As a consequence, the ap r i o r iexpected posterior exchange rate uncertainty under
g1 will be lower than under g2.
Our notion of exchange rate transparency is based on the informational content
of the signal. A signal that conveys information about the future exchange rate
aﬀects the economic uncertainty to which the ﬁrm is exposed. We characterize
the foreign exchange market as more transparent if the signal, y,c o n v e y sm o r e
precise information about the future exchange rate, e1. Thus, higher exchange rate
transparency implies that exchange rate risk is reduced through the dissemination
of more reliable information.
Deﬁnition 2 (Exchange Rate Transparency) Let g1 and g2 be two informa-
tion systems for the future exchange rate e1. The foreign exchange market is said
to be more transparent under g1 than under g2,i fg1 Âinf g2.
7The following lemma contains a property of information systems that turns out
to be a convenient tool for our analysis. The lemma formulates an alternative
transparency criterion that is equivalent to the condition stated in Deﬁnition 2.
Lemma 1 The foreign exchange market is more transparent under g1 than under











holds for every convex function F(·) on the set of density functions over Ω.
A proof of Lemma 1 can be found in Kihlstrom (1984). Note that ν1(·|y) and
ν2(·|y) are the posterior beliefs under the two information systems. Thus, Lemma
1 implies that more transparency (weakly) raises the expectation of any convex
function of posterior beliefs. For concave functions, F, the inequality is reversed.
3 Exchange Rate Transparency and Export Volume
W en o wt u r nt ot h eq u e s t i o nh o wt h ee x p o r tv o l u m eo ft h eﬁrm is aﬀected as the
foreign exchange market becomes more transparent. The export decision, x,i s
contingent on the signal y.W ed e ﬁn et h ee x p o r tv o l u m e ,X,a st h ea v e r a g ee x p o r t
level before the signal has been observed,




T h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o nc h a r a c t e r i z e st h ei m p a c to fm o r ee x c h a n g er a t et r a n s -
parency on the export volume in terms of the curvature of the marginal cost func-
tion.
Proposition 2 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems such that the foreign
exchange market is more transparent under g1 than under g2.T h ee x p o r tv o l u m e
of the ﬁrm is higher (lower) under g1 than under g2, if the marginal cost function
C0(x) is concave (convex).
8Proof: In view of (12) and Lemma 1, we have to show that the export decision,
x(y), is convex (concave) in the updated posterior belief ν(e1|y) if C0(x) is a con-
cave (convex) function. By (6), x(y) depends on ν(e1|y) only via the forward rate
ef(y).S i n c eef = E[˜ e1|y] is linear in the posterior belief ν(e1|y), the export decision
x(y) will be convex (concave) in ν(e1|y) if it is convex (concave) in ef(y).O b v i -
ously, x(y)=( C0)−1(ef(y)) is convex (concave) in ef(y) if C0 is a concave (convex)
function. The proof is complete. ¤
A c c o r d i n gt oP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,t h er o l eo f more transparency on the foreign ex-
change market for the export volume depends only on the curvature of the marginal
cost function.4 In particular, under the standard speciﬁcation of decreasing returns
to scale, more exchange rate transparency may stimulate or depress international
trade. If the cost function is quadratic and, hence, the marginal cost function is
linear, the export volume will not be aﬀected by more transparency in the foreign
exchange market.
To illustrate this result, consider the extreme cases where g1 is fully informative
and g2 is uninformative. Under the information system g2, the signal y does not
reveal any information about ˜ e1. Thus, the forward rate is equal to the unconditional




By contrast, under the information system g1, the signal reveals the future exchange





Using Jensen’s inequality, (13) and (14) imply Xg1
(≤)
≥ Xg2 if (C0)−1 is convex
(concave).
4Convexity of the marginal cost function is a pattern often seen in agriculture and in manu-
facturing where the presence of some ﬁxed input factors (land, building of ﬁxed size) eventually
constrains production. By contrast, production processes that exhibit high substitutability among
input factors may give rise to concave marginal cost functions.
9The result in Proposition 1 diﬀers markedly from the role attributed to ex-
change rate transparency in earlier studies (e.g., Viaene and de Vries (1992), Broll
et.al.(1995)). These studies have modeled lower transparency in the foreign ex-
change market simply by means of an exogenous mean preserving spread (MPS) of
t h er a n d o me x c h a n g er a t e .AM P Sh a sn oi m p a c to nt h et e r m so fc o n t r a c t i n go nt h e
forward exchange market. Therefore, referring to the separation property accord-
ing to which the forward exchange rate determines the export volume, those earlier
studies have concluded that exchange rate transparency does not aﬀect international
trade. By contrast, our approach implies that higher exchange rate transparency
aﬀects the forward exchange rate — and, hence, the ﬁrm’s exports — through the
additional information conveyed by the signals. The endogenous terms of forward
contracting, therefore, constitutes an important link through which exchange rate
transparency may aﬀect international trade.
Proposition 1 might explain why the empirical evidence regarding the eﬀect of
exchange rate randomness on the volume of international trade has so far been in-
conclusive (Cushman (1988), Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989), Stein (1991), McKen-
zie (1999)): countries that diﬀer with respect to their technologies for export pro-
duction in the sense of Proposition 1 should be expected to exhibit opposing links
between (ex post) exchange rate uncertainty and export volume.
Proposition 3 Let g1 and g2 be two information systems such that the foreign





are higher under g1 than under g2.


















10T h ec o n v e x i t yo ft h ec o s tf u n c t i o ni m p l i e st h a t(C0)−1(·) is monotone increasing.
Therefore, (17) yields the convexity of the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni nt h ef o r w a r dr a t eef(y).
¤
According to Proposition 2, expected ﬁrm proﬁts increase with more exchange
rate transparency regardless of attitudes towards risk and of technological param-
eters, as long as the cost function is convex. This result does not imply, however,
that the ﬁrm will be better oﬀ — in terms of ex ante expected utility — if the foreign
exchange market becomes more transparent. When the signal aﬀects an insurable
risk, like in our model, the eﬀect of better information on ex ante expected utility
depends on two opposing mechanisms. Firstly, when the ﬁrm receives more reliable
information it is able to improve its decision, thereby increasing ex ante expected
utility (Blackwell-eﬀect). Secondly, as was pointed out by Hirshleifer (1971,1975),
better information may interfere with the operation of risk sharing markets thereby
destroying some risk sharing opportunities. Since the ﬁrm is risk-averse, ex ante
expected utility declines. Due to these opposing eﬀects the overall impact of more
exchange rate transparency on the ﬁrm’s welfare is ambiguous.5
4C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
In this paper we have studied the role of transparency in the foreign exchange
market for the export volume and expected proﬁts of a competitive international
ﬁrm. Exchange rate transparency was deﬁned in terms of the informativeness of
a signal that conveys some information about the future spot exchange rate. The
export volume and expected ﬁrm proﬁts were deﬁned by means of the ex ante
expected values for export production and proﬁts. Our analysis has produced two
main results: more transparency in the foreign exchange market increases expected
ﬁrm proﬁts, but does not necessarily stimulate the export volume. If the ﬁrm’s
marginal cost function is concave (convex), more exchange rate transparency leads
to a higher (lower) export volume.
5In a diﬀerent framework, the interaction between the Blackwell-eﬀect and the Hirshleifer-eﬀect
has been studied in some recent papers by Schlee (2001), Drees and Eckwert (2003), and Eckwert
and Zilcha (2001,2003).
11We have conducted our analysis in a partial equilibrium setting. Therefore the
results must be interpreted with care if, as is often done in the literature on the
exporting behavior of international ﬁrms, export volume is taken as a proxy for the
volume of international trade. Yet, it is possible, in principle, to embed our model
into a general equilibrium approach along the lines in Broll and Eckwert (1998).
The key mechanisms that produce the results in this paper would equally apply in
such a general equilibrium model. This observation may justify an interpretation of
our ﬁndings in terms of a link between exchange rate transparency and the volume
of international trade.
In deriving our results we have assumed that a futures market for foreign cur-
rency exists. In less developed economies where ﬁrms cannot use such risk sharing
t o o l s ,t h er o l eo fe x c h a n g er a t et r a n s p a r e n c yf o rp r o ﬁts and export volumes may
be diﬀerent. It is well known that an exporting ﬁrm may react quite diﬀerently to
changes in risk exposure under various market structures (K.P. Wong (2001,2002)).
The importance of the market structure for the mechanisms discussed in this paper
will be the topic of future research.
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